Abstract. ANSI X9.24-1:2009 specifies the key check value, which is used to verify the integrity of the blockcipher key. This value is defined as the most significant bits of the ciphertext of the zero block, and is assumed to be publicly known data for verification. ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011 illustrates a total of ten CBC MACs, where one of these MACs, the basic CBC MAC, is widely known to be insecure. In this paper, we consider the remaining nine CBC MACs and derive the quantitative security impact of using the key check value. We first show attacks against five MACs by taking advantage of the knowledge of the key check value. We then prove that the analysis is tight, in a concrete security paradigm. For the remaining four MACs, we prove that the standard birthday bound still holds even with the presence of the key check value. As a result, we obtain a complete characterization of the impact of using ANSI X9.24-1 key check value with the ISO/IEC 9797-1 MACs.
Introduction
Background. A Message Authentication Code, or a MAC, is a fundamental cryptographic primitive to ensure the authenticity of messages. A MAC is a keyed function that takes a message as its input and produces a fixed length string called a tag. The tag is then used to verify the integrity of the message, i.e., the message is indeed originated from the intended party who shares the key.
There are several ways of constructing MACs, and CBC MAC is a widely used MAC based on a blockcipher. While the basic CBC MAC has a proof of security when it is used for messages of one fixed length [4, 6] , it is known that it allows the so called length-extension attack when the message length can vary. To avoid the weakness, several variants of CBC MAC were proposed. ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011 [15] specifies six different versions of CBC MACs, where each MAC is defined by specifying the final iteration and the output transformation. The six MACs are further classified by specifying the key derivation method and the padding method, and Annex C in [15] illustrates a total of ten different CBC MACs depending on the choice of these methods.
In some MACs and other blockcipher modes of operation, the value E K (0 n ) is used to derive the "sub-key." For example, MAC5 in [15] , also known as CMAC [12] , uses this value as a sub-key that has to be kept secret from the adversaries. Other examples that use E K (0 n ) as a sub-key include GCM [22, 13] , PMAC [8, 28] , and OCB [30, 28] . MAC5 has the proof of security [16, 17] , while disclosing a part of E K (0 n ) is not taken into account in the proof, and it is anticipated that there is some security loss when it is used with the key check value. Indeed, [2, 12] give an explicit warning that the value E K (0 n ) has to be kept secret, but there is no prior work that derives the security loss in a quantitative way, which is the main question solved in the present paper.
Contributions. We consider the security of ten MACs, CBC MAC and its variants, specified in [15] , in the presence of the key check value. We first consider MAC2.1, which is also known as EMAC [10] . Petrank and Rackoff showed that it is a secure MAC [25] . The security bound without the use of the key check value is O(σ 2 /2 n ) [25] assuming that the underlying blockcipher satisfies an appropriate security notion, where σ is the total length of queries in blocks made by the adversary, and n is the block size of the underlying blockcipher in bits. This implies that the adversary needs to make Ω(2 n/2 ) queries in order to make a forgery. In its specification, the value E K (0 n ) does not appear as in the case for MAC5. However, based on a similar technique to the one in [18] , we present attacks with O(2 (n−s)/2 ) queries when it is used with the s-bit key check value. For MAC5, the security bound without the use of the key check value is O(σ 2 /2 n ) [16, 17] . We show that almost the same attacks against MAC2.1 can be used to attack MAC5 with O(2 (n−s)/2 ) queries when it is used with the s-bit key check value. We point out that similar attacks can be used against MAC2.2 (EMAC [10] ), MAC3 (ANSI retail MAC [1] ), and MAC6.2 (FCBC [9] ).
We then formalize a security notion of a variant of a pseudorandom function that captures the key check value, and for these five MACs, we prove that the analysis is tight. That is, under the appropriate assumption about the underlying blockcipher, we show that the adversary actually needs to make Ω(2 (n−s)/2 ) queries in order to mount the attacks. For the remaining four MACs, MAC1.2, MAC4.1 (MacDES [19] ), MAC4.2 (MacDES [19] ), and MAC6.1 (FCBC [9] ), the situation is quite different. Even if the key check value consists of the entire n bits of E K (0 n ), we show that the standard birthday bound still holds, and there is almost no security loss for these MACs. As a result, we obtain a complete characterization of the impact of using ANSI X9.24-1 key check value with the ISO/IEC 9797-1 MACs. See Table 1 for the summary of this paper. In the table, the block size of the underlying blockcpher is n bits, s is the bit length of the key check value, and σ is the total length of queries in blocks made by the adversary. All results for MAC1.1 are widely known. Results on existential forgeries for MAC1.2, MAC4.1, MAC4.2, and MAC6.1 follow from [27, 15] . The attacks are possible without using the key check value. We note that there are other attacks for all these MACs, e.g., a key recovery attack. See [15] and [29] for more details.
We also discuss several generic ways to avoid the security loss in the presence of the key check value.
Remarks. We argue that our security bounds, both O(σ 2 /2 n−s ) and O(σ 2 /2 n ), are non-trivial, in the sense that there are blockcipher modes of operation that become completely insecure if the key check value is used. For instance consider the CTR encryption mode where the initial counter value starts with 0 n . It is not hard to see that the adversary succeeds in distinguishing between a ciphertext and a random string of the same length as the ciphertext even if the key check value consists of one bit.
We remark that the presence of the key check value can be considered as a special case of leakage of the internal state. Leakage resilient MACs are proposed, e.g., in [11, 21] . In contrast to 
designing new schemes, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the security of widely standardized and deployed MACs when used with the key check value, a common practice in financial applications.
We also remark that this paper does not show the analysis of MACs in the older version of ISO/IEC 9797-1 that was published in 1999 [14] . Specifically, MAC5 and MAC6 in the 2011 version are different from those in the 1999 version. We leave the analyses of these MACs as open questions.
Preliminaries
For a finite set X , X $ ← X means that an element X is chosen from X uniformly at random. Let {0, 1} * be the set of all finite bit strings including the empty string. If X, Y ∈ {0, 1} * are equal-length strings then X ⊕ Y is their bitwise xor. If X, Y ∈ {0, 1} * are strings then X ∥ Y , or simply XY , denote their concatenation. If X ∈ {0, 1} * is a string then |X| denotes its length in bits. Throughout the paper we fix the block size n. Typical values of n are 64 and 128. We let {0, 1} n be a set of all bit strings of n bits. For a string X ∈ {0, 1} nℓ with ℓ ≥ 1, the partition X [1] · · · X[ℓ] of X are defined as the unique strings satisfying the conditions
is the left shift of X by 1 bit. For a positive integer ℓ and a string X such that ℓ ≤ |X|, msb ℓ (X) is the leftmost ℓ bits of the string X, and lsb ℓ (X) is the rightmost ℓ bits of X. For non-negative integers ℓ and n such that ℓ < 2 n , bin n (ℓ) is an n-bit binary representation of ℓ.
A blockcipher is a family of permutations. We write E : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n for a blockcipher, where K ∈ {0, 1} k is a key and E K (·) = E(K, ·) is the permutation over {0, 1} n specified by K. We write Perm(n) for the set of all permutations over {0, 1} n , and Rand(n) for the set of all functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} n .
A MAC is a keyed function M K . It takes an input message M ∈ {0, 1} * and outputs a tag T ∈ {0, 1} τ . The value τ is called a tag length, and we consider the case τ = n. An adversary A against the MAC is an algorithm that has access to the MAC oracle, M K , and outputs a forgery, which is a pair of a message and a tag, (M * , T * ). A can be a probabilistic algorithm or a deterministic algorithm. We say A forges if T * was not previously returned from the MAC oracle in a response to a query M * . In KD(K), ℓ + i is the arithmetic addition of ℓ and i. In double(L), constantn is an n-bit constant that depends on n. For example, constant64 = 0x0 · · · 01b and constant128 = 0x0 · · · 087. When M is the empty string, we have pad2(M ) = 0 2n .
ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011 MACs
Let E : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a blockcipher. The basic CBC MAC is defined in Fig. 1 . It takes a message M as input, where |M | is a positive multiple of n, and returns an n-bit tag T . We write T ← CBC K (M ) . The specification of the MACs defined in ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011 [15] is in Fig. 2 , and illustrated in Fig. 3 . The subroutines KD, double, pad1, pad2, and pad3 are specified in Fig. 1 . KD is a key derivation function and is used in MAC6.1. double is a doubling operation in GF(2 n ) and is used in MAC5. We note that L is defined as double(E K (0 n )). pad1, pad2, and pad3 are functions for padding. Our description may seem to be different from the ones in [15] in appearance, but they are carefully distilled for simpler presentation, and they are the same algorithms as specified in [15] . A total of six MACs are specified in [15] . The ten MACs in Fig. 2 are taken from [15, Annex C, Table C .1], which are specified as the concrete choices of the final iteration, the output transformation, and the padding method. For all MACs except for MAC4.1, they take a message M ∈ {0, 1} * as their input, while MAC4.1 takes a message M such that |M | ≥ n as input. All these ten MACs return an n-bit tag T (we only consider the case where the tag consists of a full n-bit string). The key derivation method is not specified in [15, Annex C, 
ANSI X9.24:2009 Key Check Value
In [2] , the key check value is defined as follows. "The optional check values, as mentioned in notes 2 and 3 above, are the left-most six hexadecimal digits from the ciphertext produced by using the DEA in ECB mode to encrypt to 64-bit binary zero value with the subject key or key component. The check value process may be simplified operationally, while still retaining reliability, by limiting the check value to the left-most four or six hexadecimal digits of the ciphertext. (Using the truncated check value may provide additional security in that the ciphertext which could be used for exhaustive key determination would be unavailable.)"
The key check value for the 56-bit key K is thus msb 24 (DES K (0 64 )) or msb 16 (DES K (0 64 )). The key check value is used to verify the integrity of K or as the ID for K in financial services including banking systems. The value is inherently a public value for verification, and it may be transmitted, sent or stored in clear, which implies that an adversary can learn this value.
In [2] , the key check value is defined for DES or TDES, 64-bit blockciphers. However, other documents do not limit the block size being 64 bits. For example, the key check value of AES, a 128-bit blockcipher, is mentioned in [23] . MACs in [15] can be used with AES, and the document gives a warning about the use of the key check value. A similar warning can be found in [12, 13] , where AES can be used. Although it is not clear how the key check value is defined for AES 
in these documents, in this paper, for generality, we naturally extend the definition to any blockcipher E and allow other lengths of the key check value. For a blockcipher E K : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n with key K ∈ {0, 1} k and an integer s such that 0 ≤ s ≤ n, we define the key check value, KCV, as
We leave s as a parameter that can be defined by a user of the blockcipher. Now suppose that a MAC internally uses the blockcipher E and the key space of the MAC is ({0, 1} k ) w for some integer w ≥ 1. That is, a total of w blockcipher keys K 1 , . . . , K w ∈ {0, 1} k are used in the MAC, and it is built from E K 1 , . . . , E Kw . Then we define the key check value of the MAC as 
Security Analysis

Security Analysis for Case s = n
We first consider the most extreme case s = n to illustrate the impact.
Existential Forgery against MAC2.1. Let KCV = msb s (E K (0 n )) be the key check value given to the adversary A, where s = n. Let M be any message, and T = MAC2.1 K (M ) be the corresponding tag. A is given the known message and tag pair ( 
We see that all these messages, regardless of the number of the intermediate KCV blocks, share the same tag T , and therefore, (M * , T ) is a valid forgery. We next consider the case 0 ≤ |M | < n. We assume that pad1(M ) ̸ = KCV. Then there exists some
and it can be easily verified that (M * , T ) is a valid forgery. If pad1(M ) = KCV, then M ′ in (1), and hence M * , cannot be defined and the attack does not work. However, there is at most one such M , and thus A can simply ask for the second known message and tag pair to mount the attack. Therefore, MAC2.1 allows existential forgeries if the adversary knows any message and tag pair (M, T ), where pad1(M ) ̸ = KCV.
Selective Forgery against MAC2.1. Almost the same idea can be used for a selective forgery against MAC2.1. Let M * be a message that A tries to forge. We show that A is able to obtain the correct tag for M * with one chosen message and tag pair, provided that pad1 (M * 
where M ′ is a string that satisfies 0 ≤ |M ′ | < n and pad1(M ′ ) = pad1(M * ) ⊕ KCV. Then A asks M to its MAC oracle and obtains T = MAC2.1 K (M ) . We see that (M * , T ) is a valid forgery. We remark that if pad1(M * ) = KCV, then this particular M * does not seem to allow attacks.
Existential/Selective Forgeries against MAC5. As in the case for MAC2.1, A is given KCV = E K (0 n ). We see that existential and selective forgeries against MAC2.1 are irrelevant to the operations on the last message block, and almost the same attacks can be applied against MAC5. Besides these attacks, there are other trivial attacks on MAC5. Recall that KCV = E K (0 n ) is used to compute the value of L. With KCV, A can compute both L = double(E K (0 n )) and double(double(E K (0 n ))). This implies that, from A's view point, MAC5 is essentially reduced to MAC1.1, and therefore almost the same attacks against MAC1.1 in Appendix A work for MAC5.
There are subtle differences due to the padding rule of MAC5, but the modification is rather straightforward and we thus omit the details.
Existential/Selective Forgeries against Other MACs. We point out that very similar attacks against MAC2.1 can be applied on MAC2.2, MAC3, and MAC6.2. For MAC2.2, A is given KCV = (E K (0 n ), E K ′ (0 n )), but the attacks are possible by using only E K (0 n ). For MAC3, we see that the attacks against MAC2.1 are irrelevant to the operations on the last message block, and thus the same attacks can be applied. With the same reasoning these attacks can be applied on MAC6.2.
Security Analysis for Case s < n
We next consider the case s < n.
Existential/Selective Forgeries against MAC2.1. The adversary A has access to the MAC2.1 K (·) oracle. Let KCV = msb s (E K (0 n )) be the key check value given to A. We first derive the value of E K (0 n ).
Let r = 2 (n−s)/2 . A first chooses r random strings rand 1 , . . . , rand r , where |rand i | = n − s for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r and rand i ̸ = rand j for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ r. Similarly, A chooses r random strings rand 
Then it is easy to see that we have pad1 (M i 
) be the input and output sequences of E K in the computation of
Similarly, we have
Note that
We claim that, with a high probability, there exists a pair of indices (j, j ′ ) such that
from the invertibility of E K , and this is equivalent to
, and from the standard birthday paradox, we have the claim.
Let (j, j ′ ) be the pair of indices such that
With the knowledge of E K (0 n ), A can produce arbitrarily number of existential forgeries with one known message and tag pair, and can produce a selective forgery with one chosen message and tag pair, as described in Sect. 5.1. Therefore, MAC2.1 allows existential forgeries with 2 · 2 (n−s)/2 chosen messages and one known message, and it allows selective forgery with 1 + 2 · 2 (n−s)/2 chosen messages.
Existential/Selective Forgeries against MAC5. As in the case for MAC2.1, A is given KCV = msb s (E K (0 n )). We see that exactly the same procedure can be used to retrieve the value of E K (0 n ), which is also used to compute a value of L. Therefore, MAC5 allows existential forgeries with 2 · 2 (n−s)/2 chosen messages and one known message, and it allows selective forgery with 1 + 2 · 2 (n−s)/2 chosen messages.
Besides these attacks, since L is now known to the adversary, the standard length-extension attack in Appendix A can be used to attack MAC5.
Existential/Selective Forgeries against Other MACs.
We remark that similar attacks can be used against MAC2.2, MAC3, and MAC6.2. These MACs allow existential forgeries with 2 · 2 (n−s)/2 chosen messages and one known message, and they allow selective forgeries with 1 + 2 · 2 (n−s)/2 chosen messages.
We note that the attacks presented in this section cannot be used against MAC1.2, MAC4.1, MAC4.2, and MAC6.1 even if s = n.
Provable Security Results
We present the provable security results for the nine ISO/IEC 9797-1 MACs.
Security Definition for MACs. Let M K 1 ,...,Kw : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n be a MAC with key space ({0, 1} k ) w for some w ≥ 1. An adversary A is an algorithm that outputs a bit. We consider the following game. First, A is given the key check value KCV = (msb
Then A is given access to an oracle, which is either the MAC oracle or the ideal random oracle. The MAC oracle M K 1 ,...,Kw takes a message M as the input and returns T = M K 1 ,...,Kw (M ) . The random oracle R takes a message M to return a random string T . We define
where the first probability is taken over the choices of K 1 , . . . , K w and A's coin, and the last is over the choices of K 1 , . . . , K w used for KCV, the random oracle, and A's coin. Specifically, if M uses single blockcipher key K, i.e., if M ∈ {MAC1.1, MAC1.2, MAC2.1, MAC5, MAC6.1}, then A is given KCV = msb s (E K (0 n )), and we consider
For M with two blockcipher keys K and
We write Adv
, where the maximum is taken over adversaries A whose time complexity, number of queries, and query complexity are at most t, q, and σ, respectively. For the time complexity, we fix a model of computation and a choice of encoding, and it includes the running time and the code size. The query complexity is the total length in blocks of the padded queries made to the oracle. For instance if we consider an adversary A attacking MAC1.2 and if A makes queries M 1 , . . . , M q , then the query complexity is ∑ 1≤i≤q |pad2(M i )|/n. Without loss of generality, we exclude the trivial queries, and we apply this convention to all adversaries in this paper.
We note that the above definitions capture the security of a MAC as a pseudorandom function, or a PRF, in the presence of KCV. It is well known that PRFs are secure MACs, see e.g. [4] .
Security Definition for Blockciphers. We consider three security notions for the underlying blockcipher [20, 5] . Let E K : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a blockcipher, E −1 K be its inverse, P, P ′ : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be two independent random permutations, and P −1 be the inverse of P . An adversary A is an algorithm that outputs a bit. For A, we define
where
The last one is a particular form of related key attacks [5] . We fix a model of computation and a choice of encoding, and write Adv
, where the maximum is taken over adversaries A whose time complexity is at most t and whose query complexity is at most σ. The query complexity is the total number of queries made to the oracles. 
Adv prf-kcv
A proof overview is presented in Sect. 7, and the proof is presented in Appendices C-G. Discussions. For the assumption about the underlying blockcipher, we require the security against related key attacks for MAC2.1, MAC4.1, and MAC4.2. These are the MACs that use there is an attack with the suggested success probability with the birthday query complexity. See Appendix B. We also note that the use of ℓ in MAC6.1 comes from the use of the key derivation function.
We argue that, if s stays relatively small as specified in [2] , depending on applications, these MACs can still be used in practice. See Table 2 for the expected number of blocks of queries to attack these MACs.
Proof Overview of Theorem 1
Although nine MACs in Theorem 1 share the same basic structure of CBC MAC, the security proofs are different in details. Our proof of Theorem 1 can be divided into five cases, MAC1.2, MAC2.1, MAC3, MAC4.1, and MAC5. The proofs for MAC2.2, MAC6.1, and MAC6.2 are similar to that of MAC2.1. The proof for MAC4.2 follows from that of MAC4.1. The first step is to replace the blockcipher with a random permutation. This will introduce Adv
depending on the usage of the underlying blockcipher. We then replace the random permutation with a random function. This will introduce a term O(σ 2 /2 n ). The rest of the proofs are different depending on the MACs.
Case MAC1.2. The analysis of MAC1.2 is quite involved. We define a number of oracles. Let M be an ℓ-bit message. After applying the padding, we have
, where m = ⌈ℓ/n⌉ + 1. Then we define an oracle that is only used to encrypt the j-th block M [j]. That is, our oracles are parameterized by ℓ and j, and a specific oracle is used only for encrypting the j-th block of an ℓ-bit message M . By doing so, we eliminate the interaction between KCV and the MAC computation part, except for a rare case of computing a tag for the empty string. We proceed by showing that MAC1.2, instantiated with such oracles, is indistinguishable from the MAC1.2 that is based on a single random function. We then show that CBC MAC that uses independent random functions for every block is indistinguishable from a random function. 
Proof. To simplify the notation, let E 1 be the event CBC
We also have Pr[E 2 ] = 1/2 s . We have the claimed bound from the two probabilities and the Bayes' theorem as
and this completes the proof.
⊓ ⊔
The proof of MAC2.1 is obtained by bounding the probability that we have a collision at the input of the last random function, which can be derived by using Lemma 1. We use the following lemma in the proof of MAC2.2.
Lemma 2.
For any KCV ∈ {0, 1} s , constant ∈ {0, 1} n , and M ∈ {0, 1} mn , where m ≥ 1, we have
which completes the proof.
⊓ ⊔
The proof of MAC2.2 closely follows that of MAC2.1, and we consider the additional event that we have 0 n at the input of the last random function. We use Lemma 2 to derive a bound on the probability. The proof for MAC6.2 is similar to that of MAC2.2, and the proof of MAC6.1 is obtained by using the result of MAC6.2 without the key check value.
Case MAC3. Let F be a random function that replaces E K , and P ′ be a random permutation that replaces E K ′ . Let Q(X) = F (P ′−1 (F (X))) and G be a random function. The core of the proof of MAC3 lies in proving that three oracles
We show this when the domain of the first oracle, P ′ , is restricted to {0 n }. We only need P ′ to generate the key check value, and hence it is sufficient for our purpose. We then replace the call of Q(X) for the final block by G(X), and the rest of the proof follows from those of MAC2.2 and MAC6.2. . We show that these oracles can be used to simulate MAC4.1, and we also show that they are indistinguishable from five independent random functions. Therefore, this eliminates the interaction between the key check value and the MAC computation. The rest of the proof is similar to that of MAC2.1, and the proof of MAC4.2 follows from that of MAC4.1.
Case MAC5. For MAC5, we define seven oracles, Q = (Q 1 (·), . . . , Q 7 (·)). We use Q 1 for the key check value. Q 2 is used for the first block, Q 3 is used for the middle blocks, and we use four oracles Q 4 , . . . , Q 7 for the final block, depending on the length of the input. We show that these oracles can be used to simulate MAC5, and that they are indistinguishable from seven independent random functions. Then the MAC computation becomes independent from the key check value, and the proof follows.
Possible Fixes
There are applications where the security loss from using the key check value is not an issue. For instance the key check value may be computed on a master key, and MACs are computed with session keys that are derived from the master key in a cryptographically strong way, and the master key may never be used to compute the MAC.
For other applications that need to fix the issue of reduction in security, one possible option is to change the specification of the scheme, or the other is to change the definition of the key check value. Since the latter seems to be impractical in view of the long history and the wide spread deployment of the standard, we discuss the former option. We present two generic solutions, meaning that they do not harm the provable security of the mode of operation, and they work for MACs, encryption modes, and authenticated encryption modes.
We can always use the key derivation function used in MAC6.1 even when the underlying blockcipher uses n-bit keys. Specifically, consider the case of MAC5, or CMAC, with 128-bit key AES. In this case, AES K (0 n ) is used as the key check value and AES K (·) is used in the actual computation of the tag. Instead, one can use AES K (0 n ) as the key check value, derive K ′ as K ′ ← AES K (0 n−1 1), and use AES K ′ (·) in computing the tag. Under the assumption that AES is a pseudorandom permutation, the key check value and AES K ′ (·) are independent, and thus the original security proof of MAC5 carries over.
The above solution introduces an additional key scheduling process, and we present another solution without it. Let K and K ′ be two independent keys for a blockcipher E. If we use E K (0 n ) to derive the key check value and E K ′ (·) for the mode of operation, then this clearly does not harm the provable security. Now consider a blockcipher E ′ K defined as
. Then similarly to XEX construction [28] , under the assumption that E is a strong pseudorandom permutation, the pairs of oracles
) are indistinguishable if the first (leftmost) oracle takes only one value, 0 n , as the input. Therefore, we can use E K (0 n ) to derive the key check value, and use E ′ K (·) and E ′−1 K (·) for the mode of operation. If the mode of operation is provably secure with the pseudorandomness assumption, we can use
In this case, similarly to the proof of XE construction [28] ,
) are indistinguishable if the first oracle takes only 0 n as the input. Therefore, we can use E K (0 n ) to derive the key check value, and use E ′′ K (·) for the mode of operation.
Conclusions
We have investigated the use of ANSI X9.24-1 key check value with the MACs specified in ISO/IEC 9797-1. MAC1.1 is widely known to be insecure, and we showed attacks against five MACs, out of nine MACs, by taking advantage of the knowledge of the key check value. We also showed that, for these five MACs, the analysis is tight and the attack cannot be improved. The results suggest that using the key check value does result in a security loss by s/2 bits, but it does not result in a total security loss. This indicates that, depending on the applications and the length of the key check value, they can still be used in practice even in the presence of the key check value, as the security impact is limited as long as s is not large, say 16 or 24 as suggested in [2] . For the remaining four MACs, the security impact of using the key check value is small, even if the key check value consists of the entire block. We also presented possible ways to fix the issue of the security loss.
It would be interesting to see the impact of the key check value on the security of other blockcipher modes of operation e.g., MAC5 and MAC6 in the 1999 version of ISO/IEC 9797-1 [14] , and it would also be interesting to see a more efficient way to fix the issue of the security loss, possibly a solution that depends on the mode of operation. Finally, some stronger security bounds than the standard birthday bound are known for several MACs [24, 26] , and it would be interesting to see if similar bounds can be obtained in the presence of the key check value.
A Attacks against MAC1.1
It is widely known that MAC1.1 is not secure for variable length messages. These attacks are known as the length-extension attack. We here recall these attacks for completeness.
Existential Forgery against MAC1.1. Let (M, T ) be a known message and tag pair, where T = MAC1.1 K (M ). We show that existential forgeries are possible provided that pad1(M ) ̸ = T holds. If |M | ≥ n then define
where M ′′ is a string that satisfies 0 ≤ |M ′′ | < n and pad1(M ′′ ) = T ⊕ pad1(M ). We see that T is the correct tag for all M * defined above.
Selective Forgery against MAC1.1. Let M * be the message that A tries to forge. The following selective forgery attack uses one known message and tag pair and one chosen message and tag pair. Let (M 1 , T 1 ) be the known message and tag pair, where 
where M ′ is a string that satisfies 0 ≤ |M ′ | < n and pad1(M ′ ) = T 1 ⊕ pad1(M * ). Next, A asks M 2 to its MAC oracle and obtains T 2 = MAC1.1 K (M 2 ). We see that T 2 is a valid tag for M * .
B Existential Forgery against MAC1.2
Let s = n. We show an existential forgery against MAC1.2 with a success probability of about n/2 n/2 , and the query complexity of about 2 n/2 . Our adversary makes one query to the MAC oracle and one verification query. Now A is given KCV = E K (0 n ). Denote the integer representation of KCV as int(KCV), i.e., int(KCV) is an integer Z such that bin n (Z) = KCV. Let ε be the empty string, and V = MAC1.2 K (ε) be the corresponding tag. Note that pad2(ε) = 0 n ∥0 n and hence
A makes a query ε to the MAC1.2 oracle and receives the value of V . Next, A defines M as
where 0 < m ≤ n and int(KCV) = |M |. Then, it holds that
Recall that V = E K (KCV) and KCV = E K (0 n ). We see that V is the correct tag for M defined as above. Now we evaluate the complexity of the above attack. It is dominated by the verification of (M, V ), and hence the query complexity is about int(KCV)/n. Since we are interested in attacks with complexity below 2 n/2 , it is necessary that we have int(KCV) < n2 n/2 , which holds with a probability of n/2 n/2 as the value of KCV is uniformly random.
Overall this existential forgery attack can be applied to MAC1.2 with a probability of n/2 n/2 .
C Proof of Theorem 1 (2)
C.1 Proof of MAC1.2 (Theorem 1 (2))
We let s = n. We first replace the blockcipher E K in MAC1. 2 [E] with a random permutation P : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n . We write MAC1.2 P for the resulting algorithm and MAC1.2[Perm(n)] for the MAC, where the key check value is now KCV = P (0 n ). Let A be an adversary, where the time complexity, the number of queries, and the query complexity of A are at most t, q, and σ, respectively. Now we can construct an adversary B that uses A and distinguishes between the blockcipher E K and the random permutation P . The simulation requires at most σ + 1 calls to E K or P , where one call is used to compute KCV. We have
where t ′ = t + O(σ + 1). Note that the time complexity is omitted from the last term, since it is irrelevant to the security of MAC1.2[Perm(n)]. Then we replace P with a random function F : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n . We write MAC1.2 F for the algorithm and MAC1.2[Rand(n)] for the MAC. Using the PRP/PRF switching lemma [7] , we obtain
Now for an adversary A, we evaluate Adv
where KCV = F (0 n ) is the key check value given to A.
Fig. 4. Definition of MAC1.2Q(M ). KCV is defined as KCV
Without loss of generality, assume that A makes exactlyueries, and suppose that A has access to the MAC1.2 F oracle. We next define a number of oracles. Let ℓ max be a constant, which is defined as the maximum integer satisfying ⌈ℓ max /n⌉ + 1 ≤ 2 n/2 . Our oracles are defined as follows, where 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ℓ max and m = ⌈ℓ/n⌉ + 1.
Let Q be the set of these oracles. In the above definition, rand
n are all random strings of n bits. These oracles do not take arbitrarily strings as input. Q (0) (X) takes two inputs, 0 n and Q (0) (0 n ), and Q (ℓ,1) (X) takes one input, bin n (ℓ). We note that we have bin n (ℓ) ̸ = 0 n from the range of ℓ. The domain of other oracles is {0, 1} n .
We see that these oracles are sufficient to simulate KCV and the MAC1. We see that the simulation is correct since rand (ℓ,j) 's are all canceled. The tag for the empty string is an exception. We obtain this by T ← Q (0) (KCV). The value of ℓ max and the range of ℓ are chosen to handle M such that pad2(M ) has at most 2 n/2 blocks, which is sufficient for our purpose. See Fig. 4 for the simulation, which we call MAC1.2 Q . We have
We next introduce a set of random functions. Let
and G (ℓ,m) (X) be random functions, where 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ℓ max and m = ⌈ℓ/n⌉ + 1. These random functions have the same domain and range as Q (0) (X), Q (ℓ,1) (X), Q (ℓ,j) (X), and Q (ℓ,m) (X), respectively. Let G be the set of these random functions. We claim that Q is indistinguishable from G. For an adversary B, define
where B Q indicates B that has access to the oracles in Q, and the same for B G . In the above definition, the first probability is taken over F , rand (ℓ,j) 's, and B's coin, and the last one is over random functions in G and B's coin. B makes queries of the form (0, X) ∈ {0} × {0, 1} n , and receives Q (0) (X) or G (0) (X), or B makes queries of the form (ℓ, j, X) ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ max } × {1, . . . , ⌈ℓ max /n⌉ + 1} × {0, 1} n , and receives Q (ℓ,j) (X) or G (ℓ,j) (X), where 1 ≤ j ≤ ⌈ℓ/n⌉ + 1. We only consider B that first makes a query (0, 0 n ), and then makes the rest of queries to other oracles. We have the following lemma. A proof is in Appendix C.2.
Lemma 3. Let B be an adversary that makes at most q queries. Then we have Adv
We next consider a variant of MAC1.2 Q where we replace Q in Fig. 4 with random functions in G, which we write MAC1.2 G . KCV is defined as KCV = G (0) (0 n ). We have We see that the only case where KCV is relevant is when |M i | = 0, since we use independent random functions for |M j | ≥ 1. Notice for non-empty queries with different bit lengths, M i and
2 G uses independent random functions. Thus we only need to evaluate the queries with the same bit length. We say that a bad event occurs and write
Here S i and S j are the input values of the last random function G (ℓ,m) . We see that the absence of the bad event implies that the responses that A receives from the oracle are uniform and independent random bit strings of n bits. Therefore, we have
We also see that, from the above argument, even if A is given KCV and then prepares all the queries M 1 , . . . , M q simultaneously, the probability that A produces collisions is not made smaller. Now it is easy to see that Pr[KCV = 0 n ] = 1/2 n . We see that, if
, where m = ⌈ℓ/n⌉ + 1. To see this, suppose that pad2(M i ) and pad2(M j ) are identical until the first k blocks. We arbitrarily fix G (ℓ,1) , . . . , G (ℓ,k) , and then the probability that we have a collision at the input of G (ℓ,k+1) is 0. Under the assumption that G (ℓ,k+1) has distinct strings as input, the probability that we have a collision at the input of G (ℓ,k+2) is 1/2 n . We continue this until the final block to see that Pr 
Finally we obtain the claimed bound as 2 2 n , and this completes the proof. ⊓ ⊔
C.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Instead of B, we consider an adversary B ′ that has access to Q, and is given values of Q (0) (0 n ) and Q (0) (Q (0) (0 n )) as the input without making a query, and then makes q−1 queries. B ′ corresponds to B that first obtains Q (0) (0 n ), and then B is forced to make a query Q (0) (Q (0) (0 n )), but B can make additional q − 1 queries. That is, B ′ corresponds to B that obtains Q (0) (Q (0) (0 n )) without making a query, and hence the distinguishing probability of B ′ is not smaller than that of B. Now B ′ is given Q (0) (0 n ) and Q (0) (Q (0) (0 n )) before making queries, and without loss of generality, we assume that B ′ makes exactly q −1 queries, and let (ℓ 1 , j 1 , X 1 ), . . . , (ℓ q−1 , j q−1 , X q−1 ) be the queries . For a query (ℓ, j, X) , let I (ℓ,j) (X) be an input value of F , i.e., we have I (ℓ,1) (X) = X, and I (ℓ,j) (X) = X ⊕ rand (ℓ,j−1) for 2 ≤ j ≤ m. We also let I be a set of all these input values. We say that a bad event occurs and write B ′Q sets bad if int(Q (0) (0 n )) ≤ ℓ max , or we have a collision in {0 n } ∪ I, or we have a collision in {Q (0) (0 n )} ∪ I. Recall that int(X) is an integer representation of X.
The absence of the bad event implies that all the input values of F during making queries are distinct, and are different from the ones used during preparing the input of B ′ . Therefore, the responses that B ′ receives from the oracles are uniform and independent random bit strings. We have
Since the adaptivity does not help in increasing the probability of the bad event, we may now fix all queries (
We first consider the event int(Q (0) (0 n )) ≤ ℓ max , and the probability is at most n/2 n/2 from ℓ max ≤ n2 n/2 . Next, suppose that int(Q (0) (0 n )) > ℓ max , and consider queries (ℓ, j, X) with j = 1. With these queries, B ′ directly chooses the input value of F . We see that, for these queries, we have X ̸ ∈ {0 n }∪{Q (0) (0 n )} since X ̸ = 0 n and X ̸ = Q (0) (0 n ), where the former follows from the restriction on the domain and the latter follows from int(Q (0) (0 n )) > ℓ max . For the rest of the collisions, the probability is at most 1/2 n from the randomness of rand (ℓ,j−1) 's. Therefore, we obtain the upper bound on the probability of the bad event as
and we have the lemma.
⊓ ⊔
D Proof of Theorem 1 (3), (4), (9), and (10)
D.1 Proof of MAC2.1 (Theorem 1 (3))
We first replace the blockciphers
with random permutations P, P ′ : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n . We write MAC2.1 P,P ′ for the resulting algorithm and MAC2.1[Perm(n)] for the MAC, where the key check value is now KCV = msb s (P (0 n )). Then we have
where t ′ = t + O(q + σ + 1). We then replace P and P ′ with random functions F, F ′ : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n . We write MAC2.1 F,F ′ for the algorithm and MAC2.1[Rand(n)] for the MAC. Using the PRP/PRF switching lemma [7] , we obtain
where KCV = msb s (F (0 n )) is the key check value given to A. Without loss of generality, assume that A makes exactlyueries, and let M 1 , . . . , M q be the queries, and suppose that A has access to the MAC2.1 F,F ′ oracle. We say that a bad event occurs and write
We see that the absence of the bad event implies that the responses that A receives from the oracle are uniform and independent random bit strings of n bits that are unrelated to A's queries or F . Therefore, we have
We also see that, from the above argument, even if A is given KCV and then prepares all the queries M 1 , . . . , M q simultaneously, the probability that A produces collisions in CBC F is not made smaller. Therefore, by the sum bound,
By writing
and by simplifying (13) as was done in [9] , we obtain Adv
Finally, we obtain the bound as
and this completes the proof. ⊓ ⊔
D.2 Proof of MAC2.2 (Theorem 1 (4))
The proof of MAC2. 
. These differences have three impacts in the proof of MAC2.2[E].
• We may assume that E K and E K ′ are PRPs. More precisely, when we replace them by random permutations P and P ′ , we have
• When we replace E K ′ by P ′ and then replace P ′ by a random function F ′ , the number of queries in the simulation becomes q + 1, where the increased one query is to compute KCV. Then Adv
• When we evaluate the upper bound on Adv prf-kcv MAC2.2[Rand(n)] (A) for an adversary A that has access to the MAC2.2 F,F ′ oracle, we need to take into account the event CBC F (M i ) = 0 n , since msb s (F ′ (0 n )) is provided to A as a part of KCV. Therefore, in addition to have collisions at the output of CBC F , we have a bad event if CBC F (M i 
is enlarged by the added bad event by at most
From Lemma 2, (14) is at most
Finally, we obtain the claimed bound from
D.3 Proof of MAC6.1 (Theorem 1 (9))
We first replace E K in MAC6. 
where t ′′ = t + O(2ℓ + σ + 1). Now we see that KCV = msb s (F (0 n )) and MAC6.1 F (M ) are independent, since the computation of MAC6.1 F (M ) is processed with K ′ and K ′′ , and these values are independent from KCV. We thus have Adv , σ) , i.e., its security is equivalent to MAC6.2[E] without KCV. We obtain the claimed bound from (15) and by setting s = 0 in (10) .
D.4 Proof of MAC6.2 (Theorem 1 (10))
Due to structural similarity, the security proof of MAC6. 
For the former bad event,
For the latter, we always have M i [1] ̸ = 0 n for m i = 1 from the definition of pad1, and for m i ≥ 2, Lemma 2 can be used to obtain the upper bound of ⊓ ⊔
E Proof of MAC3 (Theorem 1 (5))
We replace E K and E K ′ in MAC3 K,K ′ with random permutations P and P ′ . Let P ′−1 be the inverse of P ′ . We write MAC3 P,P ′ for the resulting algorithm and MAC3[Perm(n)] for the MAC, where KCV is now (msb s (P (0 n )), msb s (P ′ (0 n ))). Then we have
where t ′ = t + O(σ + 2q + 2). Then we replace P with a random function F , but we leave P ′ . We write MAC3 F,P ′ for the resulting algorithm and MAC3[Rand(n)] for the MAC, where KCV = (msb s (F (0 n )), msb s (P ′ (0 n ))). Using the PRP/PRF switching lemma [7] , we obtain
Let Q(X) = F (P ′−1 (F (X))) and G : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a random function. We claim that three oracles
, where the domain of the first oracle, P ′ , is {0 n }, i.e., it takes only 0 n as the input, and other oracles, F , Q, and G, have the domain {0, 1} n . For an adversary B, define
where B Q is a shorthand for B P ′ (·),F (·),Q(·) , the same notation is used for B G , the first probability is taken over F , P ′ , and B's coin, and the second probability is taken over F , P ′ , G, and B's coin. We only consider B that first makes a query 0 n to P ′ , and makes the rest of queries to other oracles. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Let B be an adversary that makes at most q queries. Then we have Adv
Proof. Suppose that B has access to Q = (P ′ (·), F (·), Q(·)). During interacting with the oracles, we define X as a set of input values of the last oracle Q, and X ′ as a set of input values of the second oracle F . For a query X to Q, let Y = F (X) and Z = P ′−1 (Y ). We let Y be the set of Y 's and Z be the set of Z's.
We say that a bad event occurs and write B Q sets bad if X ′ ∩ Z ̸ = ∅, or Z has a collision. We see that, without the bad event, the responses that B receives from Q are uniform and independent random bit strings, and we therefore have 
⊓ ⊔
Next, we consider a MAC, called MAC3 Q , that uses P ′ , F and Q, and KCV is defined as KCV = (msb s (F (0 n )), msb s (P ′ (0 n ))). The definition is presented in Fig. 5 . We see that MAC3 Q (M ) is identical to MAC3 F,P ′ (M ). So we have
Next we replace the function Q in MAC3 Q with the random function G. We write the MAC as MAC3 G , where KCV = (msb s (F (0 n )), msb s (P ′ (0 n ))). From Lemma 4, we have
Now we see that P ′ , and hence msb s (P ′ (0 n )), is irrelevant to Adv prf-kcv MAC3 G (q, σ) since the computation of MAC3 G (M ) does not depend on P ′ . Thus we may simply remove P ′ and msb s (P ′ (0 n )). We then see that the resulting algorithm is identical to MAC6.2[Rand(n)] where the last s bits of the key check value is removed. That is, MAC6.2[Rand(n)] has (msb s (F (0 n )), msb s (F ′ (0 n ))) as the key check value, but the resulting algorithm corresponds to MAC6.2[Rand(n)] with msb s (F (0 n )) as the key check value. Its security proof follows from that of MAC2.2[Rand(n)] by removing the evaluation of (14), and we have
Finally, putting everything together, we obtain the claimed bound from 
Then we obtain the upper bound on Adv
where t ′ = t + O(σ + 2q + 2). We define the following five functions from F , F ′ , F ′′ and rand, where rand $ ← {0, 1} n . We write Q for the set of these functions.
The domain of Q 1 and Q 2 is {0 n }, i.e., they take only 0 n as the input. Other functions have the domain of {0, 1} n . Let G 1 , . . . , G 5 be five independent random functions with the same domain and range as Q 1 , . . . , Q 5 , respectively. We write G for the set of these functions. We will prove that Q is indistinguishable from G.
For an adversary B, define
where the first probability is taken over F , F ′ , F ′′ , rand, and B's coin, and the last one is over G 1 , . . . , G 5 and B's coin. The adversary makes queries of the form (j, X) ∈ {1, . . . , 5} × {0, 1} n , and receives Q j (X) or G j (X). We only consider B that first makes a query (1, 0 n ) and then (2, 0 n ), and makes the rest of queries to other oracles. We have the following lemma. Proof. Suppose that B has access to Q. Consider B ′ that is given Q 1 (0 n ) and Q 2 (0 n ) as the input, and makes q − 2 queries to Q 3 , Q 4 , and Q 5 . During interacting with the oracles, we define three sets. I 1 is the set of input values of F ′′ in Q 3 , I 2 is the set of input values of F in Q 4 , and I 3 is the set of input values of F ′ in Q 5 . We say that a bad event occurs and write B ′Q sets bad if I 1 has a collision, or {0 n } ∪ I 2 has a collision, or {0 n } ∪ I 3 has a collision.
Without the bad event, the responses that B ′ receives from the oracles are uniform and independent random bit strings. We have
Since the adaptivity does not help in increasing the probability of the bad event, we may now fix all queries made by B ′ . 
G Proof of Theorem 1 (8)
G.1 Proof of MAC5 (Theorem 1 (8))
We replace E K in MAC5 K of MAC5[E] with a random permutation P , and then replace P by a random function F . We write the resulting algorithm as MAC5 F and the MAC as MAC5[Rand(n)], where KCV = msb s (F (0 n )). We have the upper bound on Adv prf-kcv 
The domain of Q 1 is {0 n }, i.e., it takes only 0 n as the input, and other oracles have the domain {0, 1} n . Let Q be the set of these oracles. Now let G 1 , . . . , G 7 be seven independent random functions with the same domain and range as Q 1 , . . . , Q 7 , respectively. Let G be the set of these functions. We claim that Q is indistinguishable from G.
where B Q is a shorthand for B Q 1 (·),...,Q 7 (·) and the same for B G . In the above definition, the first probability is taken over F , rand, and B's coin, and the last one is over G 1 , . . . , G 7 and B's coin. B makes queries of the form (j, X) ∈ {1, . . . , 7} × {0, 1} n , and receives Q j (X) or G j (X). We only consider B that first makes a query (1, 0 n ), and then makes the rest of queries to other oracles. We have the following lemma. A proof is in Appendix G.2.
G.2 Proof of Lemma 6
We consider an adversary B ′ that is given values of Q 1 (0 n ) and Q 2 (0 n ) as the input, and then makes q − 1 queries. B ′ corresponds to B that obtains Q 2 (0 n ) without making a query, and hence the distinguishing probability of B ′ is not smaller than that of B. Now B ′ is given Q 1 (0 n ) and Q 2 (0 n ), and without loss of generality, we assume that B ′ makes exactly q −1 queries, and let (j 1 , X 1 ) , . . . , (j q−1 , X q−1 ) be the queries. We have 1 ̸ ∈ {j 1 , . . . , j q−1 } and (2, 0 n ) ̸ ∈ { (j 1 , X 1 ) , . . . , (j q−1 , X q−1 )}. Consider the case where B ′ has access to Q 2 , . . . , Q 7 oracles (note that we omit Q 1 as it is irrelevant). For 2 ≤ j ≤ 7, let I j (X) be an input value of F for a query (j, X), i.e., we have I 2 (X) = X, I 3 (X) = X ⊕ rand, I 4 (X) = X ⊕ rand ⊕ L, I 5 (X) = X ⊕ rand ⊕ double(L), I 6 (X) = X ⊕ L, and I 7 (X) = X ⊕ double(L). We also let, for 2 ≤ j ≤ 7, I j be a set of all input values of F in Q j used during making queries. Note that 0 n is not included in I 2 . We write B ′Q sets bad if we have a collision in {0 n } ∪ I 2 ∪ · · · ∪ I 7 . That is, we have the bad event if I j (X) = I j ′ (X ′ ) holds for some distinct (j, X), (j ′ , X ′ ) ∈ {(j 1 , X 1 ), . . . , (j q−1 , X q−1 )}, or I j (X) = 0 n holds for some (j, X) ∈ {(j 1 , X 1 ), . . . , (j q−1 , X q−1 )}.
We see that the absence of the bad event implies that the responses that B ′ receives from the oracles are uniform and independent random bit strings. Therefore, we have
Since the adaptivity does not help in increasing the probability of the bad event, we may fix all queries (j 1 , X 1 ), . . . , (j q−1 , X q−1 ) made by B ′ , and evaluate the right hand side of (17) based on the randomness of F (0 n ) and rand under the assumption that msb s (F (0 n )) and F (0 n ) ⊕ rand are fixed to constants, i.e., msb s (F (0 n )) = constant 1 and F (0 n ) ⊕ rand = constant 2 . To simplify the notation, let E denote this event. Note that msb s (rand) is fixed to constant 1 ⊕ msb s (constant 2 ), and we write constant 3 for this fixed value. Now if j = j ′ , then we have X ̸ = X ′ , and hence we never have I j (X) = I j ′ (X ′ ). So it remains to evaluate Pr[I j (X) = I j ′ (X ′ ) | E] for 2 ≤ j < j ′ ≤ 7, and Pr[I j (X) = 0 n | E] for 2 ≤ j ≤ 7.
We first consider Pr[I j (X) = I j ′ (X ′ ) | E]. Using the relation of rand = constant 2 ⊕ F (0 n ) and L = double(F (0 n )), we have I 2 (X) = X, I 3 (X) = X ⊕ constant 2 ⊕ F (0 n ), I 4 (X) = X ⊕ constant 2 ⊕ F (0 n ) ⊕ double(F (0 n )), I 5 (X) = X ⊕ constant 2 ⊕ F (0 n ) ⊕ double(double(F (0 n ))), I 6 (X) = X ⊕ double(F (0 n )), and I 7 (X) = X ⊕ double(double(F (0 n ))). Now it is easy to check that, for any 2 ≤ j < j ′ ≤ 7, the event I j (X) = I j ′ (X ′ ) can be simplified as F (0 n ) = Y for some constant Y . Therefore Pr[I j (X) = I j ′ (X ′ ) | E] is 0 if msb s (Y ) ̸ = constant 3 , and otherwise it is 1/2 n−s .
We next consider Pr[I j (X) = 0 n | E]. Similarly to the above, the event I j (X) = 0 n can be written as F (0 n ) = Y for some constant Y when 3 ≤ j ≤ 7, and this event never occurs when j = 2. Therefore, Pr[I j (X) = 0 n | E] is at most 1/2 n−s .
Finally we evaluate the probability of the bad event. We have 
